报告题目：Firm Prominence and Consumer Confusion
摘要：We examine the interaction between firm prominence and consumer confusion in a duopoly model of price-frame competition. Both frame complexity and frame differentiation are sources of consumer confusion and firms make prominence investments that determine their shares of confused consumers. Under exogenous prominence, a parametric condition that synthesizes the less prominent firm’s trade-offs delineates equilibrium outcomes. When firms make investments, in equilibrium, prominence obtains endogenously and, under mild conditions, firms can support the more effective source of consumer confusion. With exogenous prominence, the impact of consumer policy depends on which source of confusion is more effective. With endogenous prominence, greater market transparency can increase social welfare, consumer surplus, and profits.
主讲人信息：顾一泉，英国雷丁大学亨利商学院教授。主要从事包括产业组织、空间经济学，博弈理论模型方面的研究工作。其近期研究尤其关注企业策略，市场效率与数字经济时代的竞争政策。研究成果发表在《International Journal of Industrial Organization》、《Journal of Industrial Economics》、《Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization》、《Oxford Economic Papers》、《Regional Science and Urban Economics》等期刊。